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Political Games of Users and MIS Professionals 
in the Information System Development Process 
 
 
Ling-hsing Chang, Department of MIS, National Sun Yat-san University, zubada@kcg.gov.tw 




Information System Development (ISD) necessarily 
involves resource reallocation in the organization. 
Resistance to the development process often arises as a 
result of disagreements stemming from differing goals 
among various parties within the organization. Resistance 
usually appears in political forms, which means that users or 
the MIS professionals may exhibit some unnecessary, 
irrational behaviors purely out of self -interest. Such 
political behavior distorts resource allocations, misguides 
project goals, and plays havoc with schedules and budgets. 
This study focuses on the following areas. (1) In ISD, which 
political behavior typically takes place in which 
development stage, and by whom it is caused? (2) What 
kind of business characteristics, such as the organizational 
culture, would affect political behavior and to what degree? 
And (3) how do different political behavior, such as 
deviation from goals, dissipation of energies, and diversion 
of resources, affect the whole organization? By this detailed 
discussion, the study seeks to make system developers 
aware of what irrational behavior might appear in the course 
of development, so that they can reduce or prevent any 
negative consequences. 





Beenman (1987) believes that in anything involving 
humans, political behavior will arise, and rational 
expectations, directions, and goals may be distorted. 
Organization members interpreted politics as being 
deleterious to morale, as indirectly related to inferior 
organizational performance outcomes, and as a source of 
organizational control in the form of negative feedback 
loops (Voyer, 1994). In these complicated human 
interactions, political behavior might occur just to protect 
self-interest at the expense of business goals. However, 
most of the studies on MIS are based on theories of Rational 
School and try to find out what is the best methodology for 
ISD. There are few studies, especially about political 
behavior, based on theories of Behavioral School. Recently, 
the political view of organizations has assumed greater 
stature in organization theory. This perspective interprets 
organizational events not only from the rational standpoint, 
but also in terms of negotiation and conflicting goals (Robey, 
1984). 
Although Grover et al. (1988) have done empirical 
research on political behavior in ISD, it was limited to the 
behavior of users, and without taking into consideration the 
character of organizations; neither did they make structural 
classifications. Among the many questions to be explored, 
the organizational culture must be a key issue affecting 
political behavior. This kind of research is scarce, especially 
in Taiwan. The purpose of this paper is to find out: in ISD, 
what political behavior will take place in which stage, and 
by whom it is caused. What kind of business characters 
would affect political behavior and to what degree? And 
how different political behavior, such as deviation of goals, 
dissipation of energies, and diversion of resources, would 
affect the whole organization. This paper expects to offer 




Kreitner and Kinicki (1997) believe that political 
maneuvering is triggered primarily by uncertainty. Five 
common sources of uncertainty within organizations are: (1) 
unclear objectives, (2) vague performance measuring, (3) 
ill-defined decision processes, (4) strong individual or 
group competition, and (5) any type of change. Whenever 
change is attempted, the political subsystem becomes 
active. (Raia, 1985). 
There is legitimate and illegitimate political behavior, 
the legitimate behavior can inhibit unreasonable policies 
(Robbins, 1979; Moberg, 1978; Madison et al, 1980), but 
people in general focus their attention on the adverse effect 
of the political behavior. Patricia (1995) finds that political 
behavior is typically divisive and conflictive, often pitting 
individuals or groups against formal authority, or else 
against each other. Mintzberg (1984) believe that it has a 
negative effect on interpersonal relationships, performance 
and productivity. 
But what factors affect political behavior? Robbins 
(1979) finds that the personal characters (such as high 
degree locus of control etc.) and organization characters 
(such as relocation of resource, low trust, etc.) can 
encourage political behavior. The political behavior process 
framework is developed through antecedent conditions, 
operating mechanisms, and outcomes (Verdenburgh & 
Maurer, 1984). 
The development of information systems brings 
representatives of user and data processing departments 
together under conditions of resource pressure and time 
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constraints. These departments may differ considerably in 
formal structure, training, cognitive orientation of members, 
career paths, and departmental mission. The potential for 
conflict in ISD is therefore great, and potential 
disagreements are likely to become manifest under 
conditions of high interdependence among group members 
in project meetings (Robey, 1989). The political campaigns 
can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are 
equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of 
power (Robey, 1989). 
Lucas (1974) believes that the real problem from the 
design of IS at the organizational level is associated with an 
intangible variable, power. The information analyst must 
therefore recognize that the ISD process within an 
organization might be accompanied by a dynamic shift in 
power and power-dependence relations (Swanson, 1985). 
Dickson & Wetherbe (1985) find that “the change of power 
and politics” is one of the key issues of the successful IS 
implementation. Building a new system and changing the 
existing system are a political process; both could cause 
disorder in the power of an organization and social structure. 
According to Markus (1983), deliberate resistance to 
information system implementation occurs when the power 
distribution implied by a proposed system is incongruous 
with that determined by other sources of power. In other 
words, those who expect to gain power support 
implementation while those who expect to lose power resist 
it.  
Treating ISD as a political process appears to disregard 
legitimate superordinate goals that may have guided initial 
system proposals. The most skeptical position is to mistrust 
all appeals to superordinate goals and to suspect that 
individuals are motivated only by their own interests (Robey, 
1993). Hence the technical system analysis must be 
augmented with a social or political analysis. A political 
analysis focuses on processes of control, influence, and the 
use of power in organization life. The political campaigns 
can continue throughout the life of ISD and that they are 
equally critical in maintaining and shifting balances of 
power. (Kling, 1984). 
Keen (1981) has analyzed the political games in ISD, and 
using the classification of Bardach (1977), divided these 
games into four categories: (1) Deflection of goals: the 
originally stated goals of an MIS project might be 
ambiguous and therefore subject to change. (2) Dilemmas 
of administration: the MIS implementation process requires 
the assembly of a number of diverse resources from various 
parties. The parties might take advantage of this dependence 
by threatening to withhold their support and thus forcing the 
managers to either meet their demands or to proceed 
without their resources. (3) Dissipation of energies: 
individuals and groups waste considerable energy either by 
avoiding responsibility or by attempting to gain power and 
control. These games lead to project delays and poor 
performance. (4) Diversion of resources: the games in this 
category result in deflection of resources away from useful 
causes and towards the achievement of the parochial 
objectives of the individual parties involved. 
Keen (1981) finds that the resistances of users are due to 
perceived threats to their political interests. Keen (1981) 
suggests that MIS professionals raise their political 
awareness. But he also finds MIS professionals are the 
protagonists in several games. Recognition of hidden 
motives and devious strategies can be a first step before 
applying techniques to prevent future games or favorably 
resolving current games. 
 
METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
There is little research on political games and their effect 
on ISD. We need therefore to further explore the key issues 
and their interactions in the complicated MIS development 
process. So this paper uses the methodology of a case study 
to figure out and analyze the questions of “why,” “how,” 
“what,” “when” and “who”.  
The purpose of this article is to find the political 
behaviors in ISD, to classify the games and to analyze how 
they affect the IS. Here six organizations are chosen for 
study. These cases have had MIS departments for more 
than ten years. They include different kinds of 
manufacturing and service industries, both large and 
small-scale, government and private enterprises, and 
commercial and nonprofit businesses. We can expect to 
find many political games from these cases. (Table 1.) 
 
Table 1  Introduction of the cases 
Case 
code 
Organization type Individuals 








B Company - Financier 30-40 Private 
enterprise 








E Government agency 40-50 Government 
enterprise 





Our research, based on the Robbins (1979), 
Verdenburgh and Maurer (1984) political behavior process 
framework, introduces three constructs to the 
semi-structured interview questionnaire.  These are (1) 
organization factors, (2) political behavior and (3) the 
affects on the IS project. 
In using the Content Analysis method to analyze the data, 
prior research has shown the categorization and analysis 
steps to be the most critical Therefore we defined each 
category very clearly to avoid misclassification. And we 
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analyzed interview data using thematic units. These were 
introduced from the respondents' description of the relevant 
events in the IS project development process. After 
selecting the relevant sentences, the themes could be 
analyzed. This the researchers did by collecting these 
themes, and coding and categorizing them. Since coding is 
subjective, it is necessary that all coding persons agree 
about the code data. Then the researchers calculate the 
reliability of the code and judge the explanation of the 
category. 
The researchers selected the themes in the respondents' 
descriptions and highlighted them. Three persons (graduate 
students) independently collected these themes, coding and 
categorizing them based on the interview record, after 
which they compared and analyzed the results. Agreed-upon 
results were accepted and disagreed-upon parts were 
discussed in more detail. If at least two persons agreed on a 
conclusion t, then it was accepted. Otherwise it was 
discussed with the MIS expert (professor of MIS). If there 
was still not agreement, then the conclusion was eliminated. 
By this procedure the themes selected and the reliability of 
the analysis unit should be acceptable. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Identification of The Political Games 
After interviews, we have found 31 political games that 
occur in IS planning, development and implementation 
processes (Table 2); for the details of these games, please 
refer to Chang (1997). 
 
Table 2  Classification of political games and their effects 
Political game Description  Effect Classification of 
effect 
1. Up for grabs Grab control before the project goal 
becomes concrete, then change project 
direction. 
Turn the goal to a different purpose 
and miss the original intent. 
Deflection of 
Goals 
2. Keeping others 
on the trot 
When the project is ongoing, put forward 
many unnecessary requests. 
Keep the project from achieving the 





3. Leaving others in 
the lurch 
Don’t wish to see the success of the 
project and do not give necessary support. 
Deter the execution of the project, 
and try to cancel it. 
Dilemmas of 
Administration 
4. Leading an easy 
life 
Object to or delay any change, just to 
avoid work or responsibility. The pretext 
is: it doesn’t pay to utilize a lot of 
resources and give the organization too 
great a shock but bring in no benefits. 




5. Providing lip 
service 
Pretend to support the project, but 
actually contribute little. 




6. Protecting one’s 
territory 
Toward the end, when the project proves 
successful, departments contend with 
each other for resources, thus 
self-consuming energies without regard to 
the goals of the company. 
Seize information resources to get 
self-interest, delay the project and 
waste energies.  
Diversion of 
Resources 
7. Over-icing the 
cake 
Exaggerate the efforts and contributions 
of one’s own department so as to earn 
merits and demand more resources or 
insist it's time for others to contribute. 
Seize resources to protect oneself 
and benefit, while distorting the 
project resource allocation. 
Diversion of 
Resources 
8. Boycotting Reject the project until some particular 
interests are satisfied. 
To seize resources, waste energy in 
negotiation, communication, 
competition, and pacification. Then 





9. Passing the buck Pass the hot potatoes on to others; put 
one’s own duty onto others and force 
others to take the responsibility for 
failure. 
Pervert the design and job allocation 





10. Tying two strings 
to one bow 
Do not work with all their energy when 
the project is ongoing.  Escape the 
responsibility if something goes wrong. 
Deter the implementation of the 






11. Taking a share Not be available when help is needed, but 
be eager to take a share when there is 
benefit. 
To attain self-interest and 
achievement, turn the resources to 
one’s purpose rather than use them in 





Pretend to be a good guy so as not to draw 
complaints, but never do what one should. 
To protect self-power and interest, 
pervert the goal of the project. 
Deflection of 
Goals 
13. Playing the cards 
close to one’s 
chest 
Refuse to provide or deliberately conceal 
important information. 
Deter the project to protect 
self-power and interest. 
Dilemmas of 
Administration 
14. Being a tell-tale Defame others’ images to get benefit and 
take advantage of the power of the 
authorities in order to take control of the 
best situation. 
Deter the implementation of the 





15. Setting terms Set terms to swap benefits for offered 
cooperation, whether or not it is good for 
the company. 
Deflect the use of resources to attain 





16. Keeping within 
the letter of the 
law 
Obey the rules, policy or codes in every 
particular way but actually make it 
difficult to implement the project. 




17. Playing dumb Pretend to be ignorant or incompetent so 
as to avoid what they do not want to do. 




18. Prolonging Deliberately prolong the work on hand 
and appear to be so occupied that they 
cannot contribute to the project. 
Deter the implementation of the 




19. Stretching and 
smoothing 
Divide the work on hand into several 
parts, do one at a time, keep busy and 
refuse to cooperate. 
Deter the implementation of the 




20. Stalling Find every pretext possible to put off 
support. (Try to do as little as possible.)  






21. Setting up a 
buffer (Red tape) 
Pay excessive attention to formal 
documents to protect oneself. (Unless 
formal documents are provided in each 
step, no information will be offered.) 
Deter the implementation of the 




22. Playing safe Avoid any unfavorable conditions. 
Whether it is reasonable, work only for 
the projects that are most likely to be 
successful.  Self-protection is the first 
priority. 




23. White-washing  To exonerate a defected policy or a failing 
action, show more commitment than 
necessary and keep flinging in resources 
to appear confident and consistent with 
the previous actions.  
Seize resources to gain 






24. Staying aloof Hold the attitude: “It is none of my 
business whether the project is successful 
or not.  After all, other people have 
responsibility for the project.” 
Deter the implementation of the 





25. Hiding the facts Try to hide the facts and do nothing if 
possible, since the boss is not familiar 
with the actual situations. 
Pervert the system goal, deter the 
implementation of the system and 





26. Old soldiers vs. 
new boys 
Assign the difficult parts of the job to the 
juniors and wait to enjoy the outcome. 
Deter the reasonable allocation of the 
project and delay the project. 
Dilemmas of 
Administration 
27. Change leader, 
everything is 
changed 
Stall the system they don’t like.  Wait 
until the leader is changed, then they are 
relieved of the duty. 
Prevent the project from going on, 
and waste the resources that have 
already been put in. 
Dissipation of 
Energies 
28. Laying siege If anyone disagrees, rightfully or not, ally 
with the key men around him and try to 
persuade him. 
Include out-group members, to 
justify the unreasonable system and 
pervert the project direction. 
Deflection of 
Goals 
29. Finding a 
scapegoat 
Try to find someone else to take the blame 
if anything goes wrong with the system. 
To protect self-interest, consume 
energies in communication, 
competition, and negotiation. Then 
the project can't go smoothly. 
Dissipation of 
Energies 
30. Keeping out of the 
gray areas 
Nobody is willing to take care of the job 
in the gray areas. 
Nobody accepts the job, for fear that 
it will threaten their benefit, with the 
result that the implementation of the 





31. No benefit no 
effort 
If the system doesn't appear personally 
beneficial, deflect the job to others with 
the pretext of insufficient manpower. 
Deflect the resource allocation to 





The Classification of Political Game Effects on Projects  
According to the research of Bardach (1977) we classify 
the 31 political games into four categories depending on their 
major adverse effects. (Table 2) 
We find that the effects the same game has may fall into 
different categories, which means a political game could have 
more than one effect on the project. 
 
The Relationships among Political Games, Stages of ISD, 
and the Roles of Game Players. 
There are three stages in ISD (Dickson & Wetherbe, 
1985): IS planning stage, IS development stage and IS 
implementation stage. In the different stages of ISD, what 
incentives and roles do the individuals of different 
departments adopt?  What political games do they play?  This 
study has obtained the following findings.  (See Table 3. “U” 
in the table represents political games played by users; “M” 
represents the political games played by MIS professionals.)  
1. IS Planning Stage: The players include MIS 
professionals and users, but we find that in this stage MIS 
professionals play more games than users. 
In the IS planning stage, when projects are just beginning, 
all the roles, targets, and responsibilities are not clearly 
defined, and both sides want to grab the power of the project. 
When they get in contact with each other, the political games 
begin. In this stage, the MIS department has the greater 
professional power, so it can easily play games on a large 
scale. 
2. IS Development Stage• A great number of political 
games appear; both users and MIS professionals play the 
games. 
In the IS development stage, the MIS department and 
users interact with increasing frequency. The MIS 
department needs users’ cooperation; otherwise they cannot 
decide on the requirements and specification of users. So 
users learn about the details of the system, and also how to 
take care of their own benefit; then both of them set to work 
playing many political games. But MIS professionals are 
more passive instead of being active. 
3. IS Implementation Stage Both MIS professionals 
and users play the games, and the scores are tied. 
In the IS implementation stage, which is the end of the 
system development, it is getting clear who wins and who 
loses as a result of implementation, who should take the 
responsibility for problems, etc. And it at is this second time 
that users and MIS professionals come into contact that 
reward and punishment is going to be distributed. So the 
political games arise again. 
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Table 3 ISD stage & political games [M: MIS 








1. Up for grabs UM   
2. Keeping others on 
the trot 
 U  
3. Leaving others in the 
lurch 
 U U 
4. Leading an easy life UM M  
5. Providing lip service  UM U 
6. Protecting one’s 
territory 
 UM UM 
7. Over-egging the 
cake 
  UM 
8. Boycotting  U U 
9. Passing the buck  M UM 
10. Tying two strings to 
one bow 
 UM  
11. Taking a share   U 
12. Being hypocritical M M  
13. Playing the cards 
close to one’s chest 
 UM  
14. Being a tell-tale  UM M 
15. Setting terms  M M 
16. Keeping within the 
letter of the law 
 U  
17. Playing dumb  UM  
18. Prolonging  U U 
19. Stretching and 
smoothing 
 U U 
20. Stalling  U U 
21. Setting up a buffer 
(Red tape) 
 U  
22. Playing safe M   
23. White-washing  M M 
24. Staying aloof  U UM 
25. Hiding the facts UM M  
26. Old soldiers vs. new 
boys 
M   
27. Change Leader, 
everything is change 
 M M 
28. Laying siege   M 
29. Finding a scapegoat   UM 
30. Keeping out of the 
gray areas 
 M M 
31.No benefit no effort M   
 
The Organizational Factors that Affect Political Games 
Kreitner & Kinicki (1997), Robbins (1979) and 
Verdenburg & Maurer (1984) all point out that under certain 
kinds of organizational culture, more political games will be 
introduced, for instance, when power resources are relocated, 
or there is low level of trust placed in individuals. Here we try 
to discover the organizational factors that can induce political 
games. 
1. Relocation of resources: To improve efficiency, the 
organization changes the allocation of power and resources. 
Ezzamel (1994) finds that in ISD the relocation of power 
would induce political contests among different departments. 
We find that the more the resource relocation, the more 
political games are induced.  
For example, when the D Company develops an 
auto-operation system, this threatens many individuals’ 
positions, for the system might deprive them of power. So 
during the interview, many odd requirements emerge and 
they ask for unnecessary check-up in the system (Keeping 
others on the trot), which in turn causes adverse effects on 
the system. 
2. Trust placed in individuals: Johnson (1995) and 
Stever (1990) point out that without trust, individuals and 
their organizations cannot function effectively. 
We find that the higher the degree of trust in individuals, the 
fewer political games are induced. 
For example, interviewees of the B Company say that since 
they are a financier, morality and integrity are the indispensable 
qualities of new employees; hence, the organization has placed a 
high degree of trust in individuals. Individuals enjoy high levels 
of autonomy and authorization. Thus in the process of ISD, there 
is sufficient trust between MIS professionals and users, and 
relatively fewer political games arise. 
3. Role ambiguity: Rizzo et al. (1970), Chenhall and 
Brownell (1988), Harris (1983), Dubinsky et al. (1988) and 
Liou (1995) find that role ambiguity influences job 
satisfaction and performance too.  
We find that the higher degree of role ambiguity, the more 
political games are induced. 
For instance: the network maintenance of the F Company 
involves three departments: MIS, communication and user 
departments (and network manufacturer). When users have 
any problems, the ambiguity arises. And since these three 
departments are interdependent on each other, the coverage 
of ambiguity is very large, but nobody will help others.  They 
play the keeping out of the gray areas game even at the 
expense of the mission. Hence role ambiguity could reduce 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and it could be a 
good pretext to play the political game. 
4. Unclear performance evaluation system: The 
organization evaluates performance in a subjective way and 
emphasizes a single standard for evaluation. 
We find that the more unclear the performance evaluation 
system, the more political games arise. 
For instance, when D Company develops an 
auto-operation system, in the planning and implementation 
stage, some MIS professionals do not tell user departments 
how to achieve the optimal performance on the grounds. That 
their organization always “evaluates performance in a 
subjective way” and individuals take turns getting “grade A” 
for their performance. So they become less and less 
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committed to their jobs. The leading an easy life game 
appears and has an adverse influence on the system. 
5. Zero-sum reward practices: The total amount of 
reward is fixed; if you get it, then I lose it. 
We find that the more zero-sum reward practices increase, 
the more political games arise. 
For instance, interviewees of the F Company say that in 
driving EUC process, some of the users do not like to learn 
the new ways of operation and do not want to take the 
responsibility. All of these result from the high degree of 
zero-sum. The total amount of reward and workload are fixed; 
the reward is given in order of seniority; it is fruitless to do 
more or better. That is why they do not like to do more 
jobs--“if I don’t shirk, then they shirk.”--The leading an easy 
life and stalling games appear and bring adverse effects on 
the system. These situations take place when the organization 
encourage individuals to use political games in order to get 
the better of colleagues and show off their own performance. 
6. Democratic decision-making: Individuals are 
empowered to do more decision-making. 
We find that the higher the degree of democratic 
decision-making, the fewer political games arise. 
For instance, when controversies in B Company happen, 
users will exaggerate trifles, and the MIS department will 
report to the higher level or the rationalization team, and after 
they discuss it together, they will do anything desirable. The 
whole process of decision-making is always done on the table 
and democratically. Thus, political games are inhibited. 
7. Self-serving senior managers (or MIS/user 
department managers): Individuals will learn the political 
games from the senior managers. The ambience for political 
games is thus developed. 
We find that the greater degree to which senior managers are 
self-serving, the more political games arise. 
For example, the directors of B Company (the superiors 
in management) will form factions through the voting process. 
Different factions have different opinions about purchase of 
hardware. Seemingly, all of them are good for the company, 
but they are actually playing providing lip service and 
Boycotting games. Hence, they make a huge obstacle in the 
adoption of ISD. 
8. Member identity: Members identify with the 
organization, rather than merely with their type of job. 
Hofstede (1990), O’Reilly III (1991) and Boulian (1974) 
point out that the more an individual identifies with the 
organization, the more he will contribute and more 
satisfaction he will get from his job. And in this situation 
fewer political games will arise. 
We find that the more an individual identifies with the 
organization, the fewer political games arise. 
For example, in B company, the budget for MIS is always 
made by the headquarter management, but each department 
can make their own evaluation in purchasing certain software. 
As they have a strong sense of belonging, they will always 
take the side of the organization and will not make 
subreptitious budget. And no taking a share game. 
9. Emphasis on team-work: Job activities are mainly 
evaluated in terms of team-work rather than of individual 
performance. 
We find that the more emphasis on team-work, the fewer 
political games arise. 
For example, individuals of A Company always 
emphasize the company’s benefit in advancing IS. Job 
activities are always centered on team-work and performance 
is evaluated in terms of team-work, too. Thus norm could be 
generated easily. So MIS professionals and users can 
cooperate well, and have no chance to operate political 
games. 
10. Risk tolerance: The organization encourages 
individuals to endeavor, innovate and venture. 
We find that the lower the degree of risk tolerance, the more 
political games arise.  
For instance, as D Company is a government enterprise, 
the norm doesn’t encourage members to venture or make 
innovations, so when they develop the auto-operation system, 
individuals will do as little as possible. They can’t take the 
risk and don’t encourage individuals to engage in the system; 
hence, every individual avoids the responsibility and play 
Passing the buck and leading an easy life games. 
11. Means-ends orientation: The organization 
appreciates the result but not the processes.  
We find that the more ends oriented, the more political 
games are played. 
For instance: the superior agency assigns D Company to 
develop the auto-operation system and it is technically 
feasible, but D Company doesn’t want to take trouble 
(leading an easy life) and delays developing it. Now the 
superior agency asks them to finish the system in five months, 
so they develop a superficial auto-operation system interface 
only and do not integrate all of related systems indeed. 
Anyway the superior agency will not know the detailed 
situation (Hiding the facts). 
12. Performance pressure: The more pressure, the more 
political behavior.  
We find that the effect of a higher degree of performance 
pressure is conditional: (1) The more ends oriented, the more 
political games. (2) If both means and ends oriented, the 
fewer political games are played. 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
In every organization or activity there will surely be 
political behavior, and it is difficult to controlled. Unlike 
politics, sociology and organizational behavior, there is little 
research on behaviors relative to MIS or ISD, which seems to 
focus on technology. From the viewpoint of the 
Socio-Technical School of thought, we need to integrate the 
social and technical plans so as to reach the optimal 
consequence and make the success of IS possible. Therefore, 
behind the political behavior there exist many cognitive 
factors, such as complex motivations, intentions, attitudes, 
cultures and expectations. This means that political behavior 
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is a sign, which is a key issue to be explored, understood and 
analyzed by the management. 
This article is an exploratory study focused on political 
behavior that occurs in the process of ISD in Taiwan. With 
six cases, we have achieved the following contributions to 
MIS practice and research: (1) We find thirty-one types of 
political games; (2) the organizational culture is really an 
antecedent condition of the political games; (3) these 31 
political games in six cases can be divided into four 
categories depending on the games’ major adverse effects, 
and the same game could have more than one effect on 
the project; (4) we find the interrelationships among 
political games, stages of ISD, and roles of game players. 
So we assert that when an organization needs to develop 
an IS project, the following organizational culture factors can 
be highly effectual at reducing political behavior: (1) If the IS 
project will have a high degree of resource relocation, senior 
management can prevent political behavior before 
development by putting in place the proper organizational 
culture. (2) Reducing role ambiguity, unclear performance 
evaluation, zero-sum reward practices and solely 
end-oriented performance pressure in the organization will 
prevent political behavior. (3) Increasing the trust placed in 
individuals, democratic decision-making, member identity 
with the organization, emphasis on team-work, risk tolerance, 
creating a balanced means-ends orientation and emphasizing 
good project procedure will result in political behavior 
having no chance to breed. In the IS planning stage, the 
manager should prevent MIS professionals from playing 
games. In the IS development stage, the manager should 
notice users playing political games, and in the IS 
implementation stage, the manager should prevent both MIS 
professionals and users from playing games. 
As this article is merely an exploratory study, could not 
generalize the results, future research is expected to be 
attempted using more rigorous methods to justify these 
findings. Further analyses are expected to be performed 
concerning such antecedent conditions as personal factors, 
and the management’s response to the game. 
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